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The capability of designing to very low cost, and to compete successfully in 
the tough Chinese market can be transformed into a competitive advantage 
in other markets. On the other hand, MNCs that are not successfully in 
China will probably not acquire these capabilities. They will be in a cost 
disadvantage to compete against Chinese companies in their own markets. 
They run the risk of becoming secondary players to Chinese companies in 
the world market, as those competing in the microwave-ovens market 
against Galanz found out the hard way. MNCs have no choice; they have to 
accept ‘China’s challenge’ to continue world players. They have to win in 
China or lose everywhere. 
 
Keywords: China’s challenge, win in China or lose everywhere, risks to 
China’s future growth, China’s entrepreneurs, China’s disruptive innovation. 5 
    
China’s challenge 
China’s amazing growth of ten percent a year over the last thirty years 
is without precedent. In these years, China has transformed itself from an 
economical and technological backward nation into one of the world’s most 
dynamic economies. It has opened its doors to new ideas and techniques, 
introduced competition to all aspects of production, strengthened its 
commitment to widespread education, and taken advantage of the 
opportunities offered by its World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. 
In 2004, for the first time, China attracted more foreign direct investment 
than the United States. The world’s fastest-growing economy is now the 
second largest behind only the United States, and by mid-century, it is 
expected to be number one. This means that any company that wants to be 
a key international payer has to be successful in the Chinese market (ALI, 
and GUO, 2005). 
China’s rapid and sustained growth created enormous profit 
opportunities and risks for foreign companies. They have to learn to win in 
the very competitive Chinese market. They have to learn to design 
‘products to cost’. Learn to develop the best cost-quality relationship in 
relation to their competitor. If they are successful in China they will be able 
to succeed in all other markets in the world. On the other hand if they are 
not successful in China, a Chinese competitor will probably in this decade 
beat them in their home markets. 
Many multinational companies (MNCs) were very successful selling 
their global brands to the affluent Chinese, particularly luxury brands. 
According to the Time global luxury survey (2007, p. 108), 22% of affluent 
consumers in China own a Rolex, and the most owned luxury fashion brands 
in China are Lacoste, Valentino, Chanel, and Bally (Degen, 2009, p. 5). The 
international luxury brand market in China will be harder for Chinese 
companies to conquer because they first have to get international 
recognition for the Chinese affluent consumer to accept them (Degen, 2009, 
p. 18). But this is not true for most other branded products marketed in 
China by MNCs where Chinese consumers want affordable prices and 
comparable quality, and have no brand loyalty. 6 
    
An example is the microwave-ovens market. In 1991 the market was 
dominated by branded Japanese and European products that had a 5 
percent penetration. This small penetration was way below the 80 percent 
in most developed markets. Galanz, a Chinese company, entered the 
market, matching the foreign brands in performance but beating them on 
price. Rather than pursue the obvious strategy of using inexpensive Chinese 
labor to make lower cost microwave-ovens for export, Galanz chose to 
compete against no-consumption in the domestic lower-end market. Galanz 
introduced a simple, energy-efficient product at a price that was affordable 
by China’s emerging middle class, and small enough to fit in their kitchens 
(Hart, and Christensen, 2002, p 53). 
With a constant price reduction based on the company’s ever-declining 
cost per unit, they made microwave ovens affordable to an ever increasing 
number of Chinese buyers. Based on its business model that could earn 
attractive profits at low prices, Galanz moved up-market against the 
established brands, manufacturing larger machines that had more 
sophisticated features. With this move Galanz began to disrupt the 
microwave-oven markets in developing countries. This strategy used by 
Galanz was christened by Hart and Christensen (2002) as ‘disruptive 
innovation from the base of the pyramid.’ 
Galanz with its disruptive innovation in 1995 already had 25 percent of 
the market in China; in 1998 it had 61.4 percent, and in 1999 in started to 
sell in the United States. Galanz used the route through becoming an 
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) to companies all over the world to 
expand its international sales and so grow its production scale quickly. The 
fast growing large production scale made it possible for Galanz to use cost 
leadership and aggressive price-cutting strategies to capture market share 
(Ge and Ding, 2007, p. 668), and in 2002 its price were already 80 percent 
below the 1991 level. Galanz with its aggressive price strategy conquered 
40 percent of the global market, with a 45 percent share in Europe, and 
more that 70 percent in South America and Africa. Building on this success 
Galanz started competing in the markets for air conditioners and rice 
cookers, aiming to be the world’s largest manufacturer of these items in the 
near future (Hexter and Woetzel, 2007, p. 194-195). 7 
    
Another example is the Chinese appliance manufacturer Haier that 
became a global competitor based on an aggressive innovation strategy 
focused on three key capabilities: design, manufacture, and distribution.  
The aggressiveness of Haier’s innovation plan can be seen in its objective: 
two successful intellectual patent applications for every work day. Today 
Haier is a dominant player in the appliance world market, selling in over 30 
countries, with a product line of 96 appliance categories (DiPaola and Li, 
2007, p. 3). 
Some multinationals like Procter & Gamble (P&G) realized that the 
initial strategy to enter the market, by building market share for selected 
products in selected large cities, in what is called the upper-tier cities 
premium consumer market segment, was running out of growth 
opportunities. This strategy was leaving the door open for Chinese 
competitors to grown unchallenged in the lower-end consumer market. P&G 
saw the opportunities offered by fast changing and growing Chinese market, 
and in 2001 started its expansion into the mid-tier cities consumer market. 
This move put P&G in direct competition with Chinese companies that often 
had lower operating costs and a better understanding of the local markets. 
In some product categories the cost differences between P&G traditional 
products and those that the Chinese consumers in the lower-end market 
could afford was so wide that just making the product cheaper by changing 
some ingredients was not enough for P&G to become competitive (Hexter 
and Woetzel, 2007, p. 6-7). 
P&G soon realized that to be able to compete against Chinese 
companies in the lower-end market it had to develop new capabilities to 
understand the needs of the new customers, and develop, market, and 
distribute competitive products to these markets. P&G started designing 
products in China from the outset to meet a target price point, controlling 
the cost required to meet the price. This approach, called ‘design to cost’, is 
a state-of-the-art practice followed in the world’s top companies in 
developed markets. The twist is that competition in China is much tougher 
that in most other countries. P&G product developers in China spend much 
more time and attention on reducing product cost that in any other country 
(Hexter and Woetzel, 2007, p. 75). Today P&G is the most successful 8 
    
foreign marketer in China as measured by marked share, with leadership 
positions in most of the product categories in which the company competes. 
China is among its largest markets measured in sales volume (Hexter and 
Woetzel, 2007, p. 3). 
This P&G capability of designing to very low cost and compete 
successfully in the tough Chinese market can certainly be transformed into 
a competitive advantage in the future in other markets. This capability is in 
essence the same that gave Galanz and Haier their competitive advantage 
to become dominant world players in their respective markets and beat well 
established traditional MNCs. In other words, MNCs that cannot compete 
successfully in China will probably not acquire the capabilities needed to 
compete against Chinese companies in their traditional markets, and 
become secondary players in the world market, as the manufacturers of 
microwave ovens and appliances competing against Galanz and Haier found 
out the hard way.  MNCs seem to have no choice; they have to accept 
China’s to challenge to defend their markets positions, and so continue 
being world players. 
 
Risks to China’s future growth 
Before we consider the opportunities and risks of doing business in 
China for those that accept China’s challenge, we have to evaluate the risks 
of China being able to maintain in the future its extraordinary economic 
growth.  To evaluate these risks, we have to understand the key factors 
responsible for its extraordinary accomplishments of the last three decades. 
The study China: The Balance Sheet (2006, p. 19) conducted by C. Fred 
Bergsten and his colleagues under the auspice of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies and the Institute for International Economics 
pointed to five factors as key to China’s stunning transformation: “The 
embrace of marked forces, the opening of the economy to trade and inward 
direct investment, high level of savings and investments, the structural 
transformation of the labor force, and investment in primary school 
education.” Of these key factors that promoted China’s growth, none is 
really at risk if the Chinese government does not deviate from its present 9 
    
economic policy and keeps up its refinement of its unique social-capitalist 
model. The real risks to China’s future political stability and economic 
growth are the remaining poverty, the unbalanced and unsustainable 
economic growth model, and the bureaucracy and corruption of government 
officials. 
Paradoxically, writes Johnston (2001, p.7), corruption may have 
helped Chinas economic development by helping to overcome some of the 
conflicts between state power, represented by its bureaucrats, and the 
forces promoting the economic reforms, represented by the fast emerging 
entrepreneurs. Corruption served as a kind of lubricant that motivated 
government bureaucrats to modify and adapt government policies that 
would have hindered the economic reforms by giving them extremely 
attractive opportunities for collusion with the entrepreneurs that promoted 
China’s extraordinary growth. 
Corruption may have helped lubricate the economic reforms but over 
the longer term it has potentially explosive consequences for China’s 
economic and political future, as Johnston (2001, p. 8) and Minxin (2007, p. 
1) points out. Illicit practices such as bribery, kickbacks, theft, and 
misspending of public money cost at least 3 percent of GDP, according to 
Minxin (2007, p. 1). It is also undermining the legitimacy of the ruling 
Chinese Communist Party, widening income inequalities between those that 
are benefiting from the economic reforms and those that are being 
marginalized, and so fueling social unrest by inciting popular resentment 
against the highly-visible new rich class of profiting bureaucrats and 
entrepreneurs. 
China’s government is aware of these risks, and is taking determined 
steps in raining in corruption, as demonstrated by the many crackdowns on 
corrupt government officials. The Chinese know that if they don’t control 
corruption, the governing Communist Party will be lose its control over the 
country as did in the past the Imperial Qing Court, and the Kuomintang 
government of Chiang Kai-shek. The same determination by the 
government has been shown in alleviating income inequality, environmental 
degradation, and in encouraging the transition from an economy dependent 10 
    
on exports to one where internal consumers have a much more important 
role. 
Most economists believe that the risks to China’s future economic 
growth exist and are a real treats to China’s future, but can be overcome by 
the pragmatic and determined Chinese government. The Chinese approach 
to political and economic development has been, and will probably continue 
being one of trial and error. Government officials describe this trial and 
error process as being similar to “crossing a river by feeling the stones 
underneath.” 
 
Accepting China’s challenge 
To win in the rapidly changing business environment of China, foreign 
companies need to learn the right ways to reach emerging customer 
segments with new products designed to very low cost, and how to beat 
local competitors in the cut-throat competitive markets. Most consumer 
product MNCs like P&G entered China in the late 80s or during the 90s 
through joint ventures with well-connected domestic partners and began to 
sell a wide range of products under global brands. These products were sold 
to the affluent Chinese consumers in the premium market of large coastal 
cities. Industrial companies selling raw materials, equipments and services 
to the emerging Chinese companies followed the same entrance route. The 
consumer products and industrial goods were bought by the Chinese at 
premium prices either because there were no substitutes, the affluent 
consumers wanted foreign brands, or the industrial company’s required 
higher-end equipment. The higher prices attracted thousands of MNCs that 
flooded China. 
The business environment is changing fast in the 21
st century China 
and things will become a lot tougher for MNCs. The friendly business climate 
were customers paid premium prices for foreign goods, that attracted so 
many MNCs, is fast turning into the most competitive market in the world 
where only the most cost efficient will survive. The massive middle class of 
250 million (Degen, 2009, p. 5) and over 400 million cell phone users that 
emerged in Chinese large and small cities have a different buying profile 11 
    
that the early affluent consumers that MNCs sold to in the 90s. At the same 
time competition between Chinese and foreign companies for the share of 
wallet in every consumer segment and business-to-business category is 
becoming ferocious. 
The unique social-capitalism economic model developed by Deng 
Xiaoping, particularly the liberalization and promotion of the Chinese 
entrepreneurs, was extraordinary successful in transforming China from an 
economical and technological backward nation into one of the world’s most 
dynamic nations (Yueh, 2008). Den Xiaoping clearly stated his support of 
Chinese entrepreneurs to fuel economic growth and progress in his 
historical ‘Southern China Tour’ of 1992 (Jin, 2003, p. 254) with the now 
anthological phrase: “To get rich is glorious” (Malkiel and Taylor, 2008, p. 
38). He echoed in his way Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter, 1942) thesis that 
without entrepreneurs acting as ‘agents of creative destruction’ there is no 
real economic growth and progress, and that the pure socials model was 
doomed because it did not promote entrepreneurship. 
 
China’s disruptive innovation 
The generation of Chinese entrepreneurs that emerged after the state 
eased the control over the Chinese economy are enthusiastically following 
Den Xiaoping’s “to get rich is glorious”, are relentlessly acting as 
Schumpeter’s ‘agents of creative destruction’, and relentlessly obsolescing 
less more expensive or less efficient goods or services. But before the 
destruction of the industry leaders, as occurred in the microwave-oven 
industry with Galanz ‘disruptive innovation from the base of the pyramid’, a 
long period of ‘creative creation’ was developing in China’s backyard (Hart, 
and Christensen, 2002, p. 52). 
China provides its entrepreneurs, like Qingde Liang the founder of 
Galanz, and foreign companies doing business in China, like P&G, all the 
essential conditions for ‘creative creation’ that lead to successful ‘disruptive 
innovation from the base of the pyramid’. Hart and Christensen (2002, p. 
52) explain that the products and services available to Chinese customers of 
the lower-end market are deficient or not yet as good as those available to 12 
    
customers in the premium market of the large coastal cities, and especially 
to customers in developed economies. The lower-end market Chinese, 
permits companies to experiment with ‘disruptive innovations’, in less 
demanding applications, and among non-traditional customers. They can 
promote their ‘creative creation’, develop new ‘disruptive innovations’, and 
let them grow and mature with almost no competition, before taking them 
up-market to more sophisticated customers, and much tougher competition 
in the premium market of the large coastal cities. If successful in China, 
they then can then conquer the world markets, as Galanz and other Chinese 
companies did. 
Most well managed MNCs are under pressure to pursue innovation in 
markets than can sustain corporate growth rate and enhance their profit 
margins. For them investing in ‘disruptive innovation’ seems irrational 
(Hart, and Christensen, 2002, p. 52). They prefer the ‘incremental 
innovation’ approach to improve their products or services so not to 
compromise their substantial investments in these products and their 
production technology and capacity. The idea of ‘disruptive innovation’ and 
having to obsolete their investments and start from scratch with a new 
technology scares them off. For this reason potential disrupters like Galanz 
are able to incubate their businesses in the safety of poor markets that their 
resource-rich competitors ignore. These upstarts, based on their success in 
these less sophisticated markets, will seek to grow up-market by attacking 
market tiers that are less attractive to industry leaders, and when they 
gained enough product savvy and production scale go after the main 
markets. 
Gadiesh and Vestring (2006) point out that the MNCs that are 
accepting China’s challenge are aware of the threat posed by Chinese 
entrepreneurs and the ‘disruptive innovation’. They are doing more than 
just competing for the share of wallet of the rapid expanding lower-end 
market. They are using the Chinese lower-end market to warm up for the 
future worldwide competition. They are building the expertise, business 
capabilities and production scale to export their Chinese products and 
business know-how to other emerging markets, primarily India and Brazil, 
and then building on their success and production scale to developed 13 
    
markets. These MNCs know that China is the lead market in preparing them 
to pursue businesses in other developing markets, it is also clear to these 
companies that to continue succeeding globally they have to win in China 
first, as P&G is winning. 
 
China’s good-enough market 
The Chinese market can be segmented into a small premium rapidly 
growing segment at the top of the consumer pyramid, mostly served by 
foreign companies with prestigious brands making good profits, and at the 
bottom a large lower-end segment served by local companies with cheap 
low-quality commodity type of products and services that are typically 40 to 
90 percent cheaper than the premium offerings of foreign companies 
(Gadiesh, Leung and Vestring, 2007, p. 16). Between these two segments is 
rapidly expanding a new market that Gadiesh and Vestring (2006) called 
‘China’s good-enough market’, building on Christensen (1997) use of the 
phrase ‘good enough’ to suggest that start-up companies developing and 
releasing new products and services don’t necessary need to aim for 
perfection to make inroads against established players. 
China’s cities are classified administratively into four municipalities 
directly under the Central Government - Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing, 27 provincial capitals -Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Chengdu, etc., 
and 310 prefecture cities. Within the municipality, provincial capitals and 
prefecture cities' territory are 856 city associated districts, 369 county-level 
cities and 1,600 counties. A common approach is to prioritize these city 
markets in to four tiers: The four municipalities, 27 provincial capitals, and 
a handful prosperous prefecture cities such as Shenzhen, Dalian and Ningbo 
into a what is known as the first-tier cities, the more than 300 prefecture 
cities into second-tier cities, the 1,200 city associated districts and county-
level cities into third-tier cities, and the 1,600 counties into fourth-tier cities 
(Lannes and Zhu, 2009). 
The premium market in China was mainly concentrated in the first-tier 
cities and the lower-end market in the second-tier and lower cities. Aware 
of the rapidly expanding ‘good-enough market’, MNCs have started looking 14 
    
beyond the premium market to  China's more than 300 second-tier cities, 
particularly to the 120 that have populations over one million, and 
approximately 1,200 county-level third-tier cities. The race is now on to sell 
in places like Yantai, Shaoxing, and Wuxi, writhe Lannes and Zhu (2009), 
where middle-class incomes is rising the same way they rose in first-tier 
cities earlier in the decade. China's second-tier cities now represent about 
88 percent of the country's GNP. As a group, those cities experienced a 
twelve-fold increase in household disposable income per capita in the years 
between 2002 and 2006, while retail sales rose 79 percent. By comparison, 
in first-tier cities household disposable income rose 61 percent and retail 
sales increased by 80 percent in the same period.  
There are many reasons for the rapid expansion of the ‘good-enough 
market’. The main reason is obviously the rising income of Chinese 
consumer as a direct consequence of the extraordinary growth of the 
country over the last three decades. These consumers with rising income 
are trading up from the lower-end products they previously purchased. 
These new consumer are the driving forces for Galanz and Haier’s rapid and 
successful growth, but also for the success of P&G, and specially the 
spectacular growth of Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) and Carrefour in China. 
The success of KFC is an interesting example of a MNC that took full 
advantage of the rapidly expanding Chinese middle market in the second-
tier and lower cities. Liu (2008) explains KFC success by its product 
localization, the introduction of new products faster and more frequently 
than their competitors, and developing products that better fit the Chinese 
consumer’s taste. The KFC highly localized menu includes congee or 
Chinese-style porridge for breakfast, Beijing chicken roll served with scallion 
and seafood sauce, spicy diced chicken resembling a popular Sichuan-style 
dish. Their latest creation is you tiao or Chinese dough fritters. All this 
adaptation to the Chinese consumer’s taste let to two to one points of sales 
advantage over McDonalds in China, whereas outside China it’s the other 
way round. Liu (2008) also warns that the success of KFC in China is 
already being challenged by fast rising Chinese fast food chains. 15 
    
Curiously KFC could not duplicate its Chinese success formula to other 
large developing markets like Brazil, were with only four restaurants in Rio 
de Janeiro in 2009 it is struggling way behind McDonalds’ 1,144 points of 
sale - 541 restaurants, 556 kiosks, and 47 McCafés - in 134 cities, of 21 
states and the federal capital. According to Liu (2008) a vital ingredient in 
KFC’s success was its leadership team. The team known as the ‘Taiwan 
Gang’, because most of the senior member came from Taiwan, had 
accumulated at least 10 years of fast-food industry prior to arriving in 
China, and though predominantly Western-educated, being ethnic Chinese, 
they inherently understood China. The experience and the understanding of 
the culture led to an intuitive knowledge of the market context, which then 
put KFC China on track to becoming a successful enterprise. Liu explains 
this point: “In order to be successful, especially for foreign companies or 
non-local companies, a deep and broad understanding of the market 
context is critical to success. To the extent that the understanding is even 
intuitive, meaning that you don't have to do the market research, you don't 
have to have multiple meetings to come to the best solution to a problem, 
or to point to a future strategic direction” (Cho, 2009). This means that KFC 
had the right team to succeed in China and probably did not in Brazil, were 
it has been struggling for decades. 
The French hypermarket chain Carrefour, whose name means 
‘crossroads’, also took advantage of the fast expanding middle market in 
China, and following essentially the same strategy of adapting to Chinese 
consumers as did KFC. Tanks of live fish, eels, bullfrogs and turtles 
dominate the fresh food sections, while vacuum-packed strips of bacon and 
slices of pepperoni lie in refrigerated cases a short distance away. Modern 
formats mix with local tastes in the French retailer's stores: Shoppers stroll 
down wide, brightly lit aisles, past displays of dried pork snouts and whole 
ducks hanging limply by the neck, as "Hotel California" plays on the 
speakers overhead (Child, 2006). Carrefour opened its first store in China in 
1995, and shot to prominence very quickly in China's retail market with its 
strategy of adapting its hypermarkets to the taste of the new Chinese 
consumers. It beat its arch competitor Wal-Mart, taking a strong initial lead 
among the foreign retailers in the grocery market, lead that Wal-Mart won 16 
    
back in 2006 with the purchase of Trust-Mart the Taiwanese owned top 
retailer in China. However, Carrefour remains stronger than Wal-Mart in 
terms of revenue per outlet, and continues to lead the field in many 
innovations in the Chinese modern grocery market. 
 
R&D in China 
The success of P&G, KFC and Carrefour are based on designing the 
right products for the emerging Chinese consumer in the fast expanding 
middle market or ‘good-enough market’. The implication is that any MNC 
that wants to succeed in this market needs to have the necessary product 
research and development (R&D) capability combined with a good 
understanding of the needs and aspirations of the emerging Chinese 
consumer. Besides doing R&D to serve the Chinese market, an ever 
increasing number of MNCs are betting that their product development 
capabilities in China will eventually become for their hub for their global 
R&D efforts, particularly in categories were competition is becoming 
increasingly ferocious like the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, and 
specially the high-tech consumer electronic area. The reason being that the 
costs of doing R&D in developing countries are increasing, and a Chinese 
R&D base could add up to substantial savings, particularly in products were 
R&D costs are important component in the final cost of the product (Hexter 
and Woetzel, 2007, p. 71). 
Hexter and Woetzel (2007, p. 71-72) from McKinsey compared the 
cost of doing R&D for high-end telecommunication routers of an American 
and a Chinese manufacturer. The R&D costs for routers sold in the U.S. 
market were between 20 to 25 percent of the total costs. This means that a 
saving of 5 percent in R&D would generate a 1 percent margin 
improvement. Now considering that engineers in the U.S. earn roughly 
three to ten times more that their Chinese counterparts, and that the 
Chinese work nearly 20 percent longer on average. Even considering that 
the Chinese engineers were less efficient and so the Chinese operation 
needed more engineers, the American company was, in the end, spending 
five times more that its Chinese counterpart to develop similar products. 17 
    
This means that the Chinese company spends 80 percent less on R&D for 
their routers, and so have a cost advantage of 16 percent for R&D alone. 
The authors conclude: “A company needs extremely persuasive arguments 
for it to forgo that sort of advantage by keeping R&D in its developed home 
market”. An interesting example of R&D in China is the chemical giant 
BASFs that has seven R&D sites in China, covering polyurethane, poly-THF, 
construction chemicals, dispersion, coating & specialties, textile auxiliaries, 
leather, pharmaceutical solutions, nutrition ingredients, personal care 
ingredients, care chemicals & formulators, engineering plastics, plasticizer, 
engineering unit, catalysts, electronic material and etc. (BASF, 2009). 
Chinese companies are using the extraordinary growth of the Chinese 
economy to rapidly developing their own world class R&D capabilities as 
demonstrated by Galanz, Haier, and BYD. According to a recent article by 
Gunther (2009) in Fortune Magazine, last fall Warren Buffet’s Berkshire 
Hathaway bought 10% of BYD for $230 million. The deal, which is awaiting 
final approval from the Chinese government, didn't get much notice at the 
time. It was announced in late September, as the global financial markets 
teetered on the abyss. But Buffett and is long time partners Charlie Munger 
and David Sokol think it is a very big deal indeed. They think BYD has a 
shot at becoming the world's largest automaker, primarily by selling electric 
cars, as well as a leader in the fast-growing solar power industry.  
Buffet and his partners, according to the Fortune article, were 
fascinated by Wang Chuan Fu, the entrepreneur that started BYD in 1995 in 
Shenzhen, China. The letters BYD are the initials of the company's Chinese 
name. A chemist and government researcher, Wang raised some $300,000 
from relatives, rented about 2,000 square meters of space, and set out to 
manufacture rechargeable batteries to compete with imports from Sony and 
Sanyo. By about 2000, BYD had become one of the world's largest 
manufacturers of cell phone batteries. The company went on to design and 
manufacture mobile-phone handsets and parts for Motorola, Nokia, Sony 
Ericsson, and Samsung. 
Wang entered the automobile business in 2003 by buying a Chinese 
state-owned car company that was all but defunct. He knew very little 18 
    
about making cars but proved to be a quick study. In October a BYD sedan 
called the F3 became the bestselling sedan in China, topping well-known 
brands like the Volkswagen Jetta and Toyota Corolla. BYD has also begun 
selling a plug-in electric car with a backup gasoline engine, a move putting 
it ahead of GM, Nissan, and Toyota. BYD's plug-in, called the F3DM for ‘dual 
mode’, goes farther on a single charge - 62 miles - than other electric 
vehicles and sells for about $22,000, less than the plug-in Prius and much-
hyped Chevy Volt are expected to cost when they hit the market in late 
2010. Put simply, this little-known upstart has accelerated ahead of its 
much bigger rivals in the race to build an affordable electric car. Today BYD 
employs 130,000 people in 11 factories, eight in China and one each in 
India, Hungary, and Romania. 
Deploying the armies of laborers at BYD is an officer corps of 
managers and engineers who invent and design the products. Today the 
company employs about 10,000 engineers who have graduated from the 
company's training programs - some 40% of those who enter either drop 
out or are dismissed - and another 7,000 new college graduates are being 
trained. Wang says the engineers come from China's best schools. "They 
are the top of the top," he says. "They are very hard-working, and they can 
compete with anyone." BYD can afford to hire lots of them because their 
salaries are only about $600 to $700 a month; they also get subsidized 
housing in company-owned apartment complexes and low-cost meals in 
BYD canteens. "They're basically breathing, eating, thinking, and working at 
the company 24/7," says a U.S. executive who has studied BYD (Gunther, 
2009). 
Another example of how China moves fast in developing new 
technologies is China’s lead over the U.S. in generating electricity from 
renewable sources. Bradsher (2009) in his article in the New York Times 
points out that as the U.S. is taking its first steps toward mandating that 
power companies generate more electricity from renewable sources, China 
already has a similar requirement almost two years ago, and is investing 
billions of dollars to remake itself into a green energy superpower. This year 
China is on track to pass the U.S. as the world’s largest maker for wind 
turbines, after doubling wind power capacity in each of the last four years. 19 
    
 
Win in China or lose everywhere 
The title of the last chapter of Hexter and Woetzel’s (2007) book “win 
in China or lose everywhere” says it all. The examples of Galanz, Haier, and 
BYD clearly demonstrate that the new champions for every industry are 
being incubated in China. Companies, Chinese of MNCs, that learn to 
compete and win in the fast growing Chinese ‘good-enough market’, will 
build strong positions to win in the global market, especially in the large 
emerging markets of Brazil and India. The scale of the Chinese market will 
give companies that are successful in China a global structural advantage 
over companies that did not accept China’s challenge. 
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